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RECENT OPINIONS

Question:
What is the correct procedure for having an alcoholic committed
for treatment and also whether or not an alcoholic can be committed
to a facility other than the State Hospital such as the Heartview
Foundation in Mandan and
1. What is the proper procedure for initiating a commitment?
2. Who is eligible to initiate a commitment?
3. Is the county judge obligated to call a hearing of the Mental
Health Board if someone wishes to initiate a commitment?
(There have been a number of incidences where a wife has
gone to the county judge requesting to have her husband
committed and the judge has refused to let her sign a complaint.)
4. Does a person being committed have any legal recourse such
as suing the person or persons initiating a commitment?
5. Can the Mental Health Board make a commitment to a facility other than a state institution?
Prior to 1969 there was no special provision providing for commitment of alcoholics to the State Hospital or other institution although in a previous opinion, it was held that a county mental
health board could proceed under the provisions for the involuntary
hospitalization for an individual whose mental health was found to
be substantially impaired by the disease of alcoholism or drug addiction. In 1969 the Legislature amended certain provisions of chapter
25-03 of the North Dakota Century Code to specifically include within
the involuntary hospitalization procedures an alcoholic or a drug
addict as well as those persons who were mentally ill. In answer
to the questions presented:
1. The statutes specify the proper procedure for initiating a
commitment. This procedure, specified by section 25-03-11, provides
for the filing of a written application with the mental health board.
Such application, unless waived by the county judge, must be ac-
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companied by a certificate of a licensed physician stating that he
has examined the individual and is of the opinion he is mentally
ill, an alcoholic or a drug addict and should be hospitalized, or a
written statement by the applicant that the individual has refused
to submit to or is unable to consent to an examination by a licensed
physician.
There is also a provision for emergency commitment procedure
in instances involving an individual who is mentally ill, an alcoholic
or a drug addict and, because of his illness, is likely to injure
himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty pending an examination. In such case, a health or police officer or a licensed physician
may obtain the written or verbal consent of the county judge, or
in his absence any member of the county mental health board,
to apply to a hospital for his emergency admission. If neither the
county judge nor a member of the county mental health board is
available to give consent, a licensed physician, who has reason to
believe that an individual is mentally ill, an alcoholic or a drug
addict and because of his illness is likely to injure himself or others
if allowed to remain at liberty pending an examination by written
order, may direct an emergency admission to the State Hospital or
to a private hospital. The head of the private hospital or the Superintendent of the State Hospital, as the case may be, must require
an immediate examination of such person to be made; and if he
determines that hospitalization is not warranted, he must immediately discharge the person. See section 25-03-08 of the North Dakota
Centurey Code.
2. Section 25-03-11 provides that regular proceedings for the
involuntary hospitalization of an individual may be commenced by
a friend, relative, spouse, or guardian of the individual, or by a
licensed physician, police officer, state's attorney, a health or public
welfare officer; or the head of any public or private institution in
which the individuali may be.
3. Section 25-03-11 provides that as soon as practicable after
notice of the commencement of proceedings is given or after determination that notice should be omitted, the mental health board
is to appoint at least one licensed physician to examine the proposed
patient and report to the board his findings as to the condition of
the proposed patient and the need for his custody, care, or treatment
in a mental hospital. If the report of the examiner shows the proposed patient is not mentally ill, an alcoholic or a drug addict, the
mental health board, without taking any further action, may terminate the proceedings and dismiss the application; otherwise, the
board must fix a date for a hearing before the board and give notice to, the person designated. These provisions appear to be manda-
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tory, at least with respect to the acceptance of an application; and
we find no authority for the county judge to refuse an application.
4.

Section 25-03-28 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:

25-03-28. UNWARRANTED HOSPITALIZATION OR DENIAL OF RIGHTS-PENALTIES.-Any person who willfully and
maliciously causes or conspires with or assists another to
cause the unwarranted hospitalization of any individual under
the provisions of this chapter, or the denial to any individual
of any of the rights accorded to him under the provisions of
this chapter, shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding one
thousand dollars or by imprisonment of not more than one
year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has also held that a civil
action will lie for malicious prosecution and without probable cause
of a proceeding, the object of which is to have a person committed
to the State Hospital. See Johnson v. Huhner, 33 N.W.2d 268 (1948).
Therefore, it is possible for a person being committed to sign a
criminal complaint or bring a legal action against the person or
persons initiating a commitment. Whether such suits would be successful would, of course, depend upon the facts involved.
5. Under the emergency commitment procedure the person may
be hospitalized in the State Hospital or a private hospital. Under the
regular commitment procedure; i.e., application, hearing before the
county mental health board, etc., the county mental health board
has the authority to order hospitalization at the State Hospital or
other suitable place. Presumably an institution such as Heartview
would be a suitable place for a person deemed in need of treatment
as an alcoholic because he is likely to injure others or himself if
allowed to remain at large. However, whether Heartview would
qualify as a "hospital" under the emergency commitment procedure
involves facts not within the scope of the opinion.
These statutes make no provision for costs of care at private
institutions or hospitals. Therefore, a private institution or hospital
could refuse to accept a person committed thereto unless arrangements for the payments of cost of treatment had been made. In this
regard, the county mental health board has no authority to make
any payments to private institutions or to order any payment to
private institutions. Therefore, the county mental health board would
not commit a person to a private institution unless there were
some arrangement made for the payment of costs of treatment there.
As a general observation, it appears the Legislature, in providing
for commitment of alcoholics and drug addicts, made no particular
provisions for their care at institutions other than the State Hospital;
and while it appears the county mental health board may commit
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an alcoholic or drug addict to an institution such as Heartview, there
is no special provision relating thereto.

Question:
In regard to the administration of the Implied Consent Law as
set forth in Chapter 39-20 of the North Dakota Century Code as
amended to date.
The issue has been raised that an arrest made at night for an
offense not committed in the officer's presence was not a valid
arrest under the provisions of Section 29-06-08. An opinion of the
Attorney General's office of March 11, 1970, stated that an arrest
for driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while
under the influence of alcoholic beverages could be made without
a warrant whether at night or any other time.
An opinion rendered in the Fifth District Court states:
Until the legislature does narrow the restrictions of Section
29-06-16, officers of the law may not arrest persons at nighttime without a warrant for misdemeanors unless such misdemeanors are committed or attempted in the presence of
the officer. That is the present state of the law in North
Dakota.
In the circumstances set forth in the opinion, the clear implication
is that there is no exception to this principal, for the offense commonly denominated D.W.I.
The opinion of the Attorney General is that this district court
opinion ii binding upon an administrative hearing officer in those
cases where the factual situations are similar to those appearing
in the case of the City of Minot v. Raymond 0. Knudson, i.e., where
a court has in effect declared the arrest invalid, or made other
determinations which must necessarily imply invalidity of the arrest.
See, e.g., the decisions in Colling v. Hjelle, 125 N.W.2d 453, (1964);
McDonald v. Ferguson, 129 N.W.2d 348, (1964). It does not necessarily
follow that the mere fact that the arrest was made at night for
a D.W.I. offense, not committed in the officer's presence, would
justify the highway commissioner in failing to revoke the driver's
license.
While the effect of a court decision invalidating an arrest may
well be to make any action undertaken thereunder a nullity, the
Attorney General does not believe the highway commissioner under
Chapter 39-20 is given jurisdiction to make the initial determination
as to the invalidity of the arrest. It is entirely conceivable in an
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instance where the arrest was made at night for a D.W.I. offense,
not committed in the officer's presence, that the defendant will plead
guilty and be convicted of the offense charged.
Where the person has in fact been arrested, even though there
may be valid legal questions as to the ultimate validity of the arrest
and such arrest may later be judicially declared to be invalid, it is
nevertheless an arrest within the meaning of the Implied Consent
Law. At such time as the arrest has been judicially declared to be
invalid and the Highway Commissioner has been so informed, the
order of the Highway Commissioner should be modified accordingly.
The statutory provision does appear to require the highway commissioner's action to be taken, without necessarily waiting for a
judicial determination of the validity of the arrest. Thus, Section
39-20-04 of the 1969 Supplement is applicable. On such basis it
would seem doubtful that the highway commissioner could continue hearings on the basis of evidence that might later cause
a court to determine the arrest to be invalid, until such time as
the court determined the arrest to be valid or invalid.
It was therefore concluded that upon receipt of the sworn report
referred to in Section 39-20-04 of the 1969 Supplement to the North
Dakota Century Code showing that such officer has made an arrest
to the point where the alleged offender charged has been detained
to be brought before a court for judicial determination, that he had
reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving
or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the
public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
and that the person had refused to submit to the test or tests, the
highway commissioner is required to take the action specified in
said Section 39-20-04. It was further concluded that the issue of
"whether the person was placed under arrest" as specified in Section
39-20-05 of the 1969 Supplement to the North Dakota Century Code
at the administrative hearing held on his request must necessarily
relate to whether or not there has been an arrest to the point
where the offender charged has been detained to be brought before
a court for judicial determination, not as to whether the arrest will
be subsequently judicially determined to be valid or invalid. At
such time as "new evidence" showing that the arrest has been judicially determined to be invalid is presented, the order of the highway commissioner should properly be modified in accordance with
same.
Question:
Whether the words "during time of war" found in Section 20-03-05
of the North Dakota Century Code which relates to the issuing
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of resident hunting licenses to servicemen allows resident servicemen
on leave in the state to hunt and fish here without a license.
Section 20-03-05 of the North Dakota Century Code states:
RESIDENT LICENSES MAY BE ISSUED AT DISCRETION
OF THE COMMISSIONER.-Any resident license prescribed
by this title may be issued by and in the discretion of the
commissioner to a person who has come to this state with a
bona fide intention to become a resident thereof, even though
he has not been a resident of this state for the required period
of time immediately preceding the application for the license
or to any person who is a member of the armed forces of
the United States, and who is within the state on furlough,
or leave, or on temporary duty, or to any person who is in
the employ of the United States fish and wildlife service or
the conservation department of any state or province of Canada, and who is in the state for the purpose of advising or
consulting with the North Dakota game and fish department.
Any resident of the state, while in the military service of the
United States, shall be permitted to hunt game birds or fish
without a license therefore during the open season during the
time of war. No license shall be issued under the provisions
of this section unless a satisfactory affidavit of some bona
fide resident setting forth the actual conditions accompanies
the application.
This contemplates two situations insofar as military personnel
are concerned. The statute authorizes, but does not require, the Game
and Fish Commissioner to grant a resident license to any person
who is a member of the armed forces of the United States, and who
is within the State on furlough, or leave, or on temporary duty. The
statute also requires that any resident of the State, while in the
military service of the United States, be permitted to hunt game
birds or fish without a license therefore during the open season during time of war.
The first situation does not prescribe that it must be in "time
of war." The Commissioner may issue the license, in his discretion,
to any serviceman on leave, on furlough or on temporary duty in
this State regardless of whether he is a resident and regardless
of whether it is in "time of war."
There is no reason for distinguishing between the Korean Conflict
and the Vietnam Era insofar as this matter is concerned. The
Attorney General's office, in an opinion dated December 20, 1951,
to Mr. Floyd E. Henderson, Executive Secretary, Veterans' Aid
Commission, held a person who had served for a period of not less
than thirty days in the armed forces of the United States during
the Korean Conflict was entitled to a loan under the provisions
of chapter 37-14 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943, as
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amended. The statute (section 37-1406) made veterans eligible for
a loan if they had served for a period of not less than thirty days
"while the United States was at war." /
However, the Game and Fish Commissioner is required to issue
no license to the serviceman. The statute merely provides they may
hunt game birds and fish during open seasons in time of war without
a license if they are residents of this State and in military service.
If they are accused of hunting without a license the Court would
determine whether they were exempt from a license under the provisions of section 20-03-05. In this respect our opinion is not binding
upon the Courts and it is the Courts rather than the Game and Fish
Commissioner who would ultimately determine the question.
Question:
What are the legal problems involved in registering a motorcycle
that has been modified by extending the front wheel and front end
assembly.
The applicable statutes would appear to be Sections 39-21-45.1
and Subsection 1 of Section 39-02-06 of the 1969 Supplement to the
North Dakota Century Code. These statutes provide:
39-21-45.1. MODIFICATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES.-It
shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle
of a type required to be registered under the laws of this state
with an unloaded weight of six thousand pounds or less upon
a public highway with either the rear or front end suspension
system or steering mechanism altered or changed from the
manufacturer's original design, except that nothing contained
herein shall prevent the installation of manufactured heavy
duty equipment to include shock absorber and overload
springs, nor shall anything contained herein prevent a person
from operating a motor vehicle on a public highway with
normal wear of the afore-mentioned systems and mechanism
and provided further that the normal wear shall not affect
the control of the vehicle through the steering mechanism.
39-04-06. WHEN REGISTRATION RESCINDED.-The department shall rescind and cancel the registration of a motor
vehicle:
1. When the department shall determine that a vehicle is
unsafe or unfit to be operated or is not equipped as required
by law;
The first statute quoted, in express terms forbids operation of
a motor vehicle with front suspension system altered or changed
from the manufacturer's original design, with further limitations
with regard to registration requirements, unloaded weight, place
of operation, etc. As to the second statute quoted, the department
could properly determine that the vehicle is not equipped as required
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by law upon completion of a proposed alteration project, and at such
point could rescind registration. There is a prohibition of operation
of such vehicles on the highway contained in the quoted Section
39-21-45.1. The term highway as used in this context would necessarily
include city streets.
Considering said Section 39-21-45.1 as a whole, it is obvious that
the legislative assembly was not intending to prohibit artistic endeavor, but rather was looking to the safety advantages of requiring
vehicles to have the knowledge of manufacturer's engineering staff,
federal regulation of such manufacturer's production, financial liability of such manufacturer, etc., regulating design, as opposed to
the facilities available to the average "do-it-yourselfer." The altered
machine would necessarily as completed have to be identical with
machines available from the manufacturer e.g., center of gravity,
strength of frames, braces, and all parts, etc., to justify the department in not rescinding registration of same, the burden of proving
such altered machine to be identical to machines available from the
manufacturer would be upon the person applying for registration
of same.

